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Perfit: The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule in OSHA Proceed

NOTE
THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIONARY
RULE IN OSHA PROCEEDINGS
INTRODUCrION

The exclusionary rule requires that evidence obtained in violation of the
Constitution be excluded at trial.' In the fourth amendment? context, evidence
obtained by a government official through an unreasonable search or seizure
will be inadmissible in court.3 This reasonableness requirement protects individuals from arbitrary invasions of privacy. 4 Generally, a search is considered
reasonable only if the official has obtained a warrant based on probable cause. 5
1.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 506 (5th ed. 1979). See C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW
OF EVIDENCE § 164 (2d ed. 1972).
The exclusionary rule has been applied to evidence obtained in violation of: a defendant's
fifth amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966); his fifth and fourteenth amendment rights to due process of law, e.g.,
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); his fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); and his sixth amendment right to counsel, e.g., Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). The exclusionary sanction has also been applied when state constitutional provisions similar to the federal constitutional provisions mentioned above have been
violated. See 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 1.3(b) (1978). Exclusion will also be required
when statutes, court rules, or administrative regulations have been violated and the defendant's substantial rights have been adversely affected. Id.
This note will deal solely with the exclusionary rule in the fourth amendment context.
2. The fourth amendment provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
US. CONsT. amend. IV.
For a discussion of the origin of the fourth amendment, see J.
SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT

ch. 1 (1966); N.

LANDYNSKI,

SEARCH

AND

LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF

(1937).
3. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (evidence obtained in violation of the fourth
amendment is inadmissible in state as well as federal criminal trials); Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383 (1914) (evidence obtained through illegal searches and seizures by federal officials
is inadmissible in federal courts).
4. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 599 (1981); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54
(1979) (fourth amendment standard of reasonableness for government officials' exercise of
discretion safeguards against arbitrary invasions of privacy).
5.
E.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967) (except in narrowly
defined classes of cases exempt from the warrant requirement, warrantless searches of private
property are unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional).
Criminal probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances within the officer's
knowledge, and of which he has trustworthy information, are sufficient to justify reasonable
belief that seizable objects are located at the place to be searched. Brinegar v. United States,
388 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925). Recently in
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Though the exclusionary rule is well established in criminal trials,6 its application and scope is less settled in administrative hearings.7
Congress established the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) by enacting the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 19708 (O.S.H.A.
or the Act). The Act charges OSHA, an executive agency within the Department
of Labor,9 to promulgate and enforce safety and health standards for the workplace. 0 The Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC)
was created to review determinations by administrative law judges regarding
citations and penalties issued by the Secretary of Labor for nonconformance
with OSHA standards.- Orders of the OSHRC are reviewable by the federal
2

courts of appeal.2

In 1978 the United States Supreme Court declared section 8(a) of O.S.H.A."
Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983), the Supreme Court relaxed the standard for finding
criminal probable cause. Overruling Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) and Spinelli v.
United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), the Court rejected the traditional two-prong test for determining probable cause for a search warrant when an informant is involved. Under the
two-prong test, magistrates were to consider the basis for the informant's knowledge and
whether there were enough facts to support the informant's reliability. After Gates, magistrates need only consider whether under the "totality of the circumstances" there is a fair
probability that evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. 103 S. Ct. at 2332.
Recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement include: searches incident to a lawful
arrest, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); automobile searches, Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132 (1925); emergency searches when the needs of effective law enforcement outweigh
the protection of privacy afforded by the warrant requirement, Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S.
499 (1978); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (no warrant required in instances of hot
pursuit of a suspected criminal); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (evidence
showing alcohol in defendant's blood); consent searches, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218 (1973); stop and frisk, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); plain view searches, Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, reh'g denied, 404 U.S. 874 (1971).
6. C. McComncx, supra note 1,at § 164.
7. The Court has never applied the exclusionary rule in purely civil adjudications,
United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 447, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 874 (1976); however, it has
applied the rule in quasi-criminal proceedings, One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380
U.S. 693 (1965).
8. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976).
9. See id. § 652.
10. See id. §§ 655, 659.
11. See id. §§ 659(c), 661(i).
12. Id. § 660(a). An appeal may be filed with the court of appeals in the circuit in which
the alleged violation occurred, in which the employer has its principal office, or in the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Id.
13. 29 U.S.C. § 657(a) provides:
In order to carry out the purposes of the chapter, the Secretary, upon presenting
appropriate credentials to the owner, operator, or agent in charge, is authorized (1) to enter without delay and at reasonable times any factory, plant, establishment, construction site, or other area, workplace or environment where work is
performed by an employee of an employer; and
(2) to inspect and investigate during regular working hours and at other reasonable times, and within reasonable limits and in a reasonable manner, any such place
of employment and all pertinent conditions, structures, machines, apparatus, devices,
equipment, and materials therein, and to question privately any such employer,
owner, operator, agent, or employee.
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unconstitutional insofar as it purported to authorize inspection of businesses
without a warrant. 14 Although warrants are now required for OSHA inspections,
the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on whether the exclusionary rule applies
to evidence obtained in derogation of the warrant requirement. 15 The OSHRC,
however, has decided the rule should be applied. 6 Two federal circuit courts
7
have agreed that the exclusionary rule is applicable in OSHA proceedings,1
but disagree concerning a good faith exception to the rule.',
The good faith exception provides that when an official acts with a good
faith and reasonable belief that his conduct is legal, the exclusionary rule should
not operate.' 9 A good faith exception to the exclusionary rule would reduce the
quantity of evidence suppressed under the exclusionary rule. Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly recognized the good faith exception, several
Justices have suggested its adoption, and a few lower courts have actually
adopted it.20
This note will examine the rationales for and purposes of the exclusionary
rule and the good faith exception in the OSHA context. Such an examination
requires a thorough review of how the rule and its good faith exception have
developed in criminal procedure. Supreme Court decisions concerning administrative searches will then be analyzed. Finally, this note will consider important
differences between OSHA inspections and traditional criminal searches and
conclude a good faith excepiion in the OSHA context would be inappropriate.

14. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 325 (1978).
15. Since the defendant employer in Barlow's brought suit to enjoin an OSHA compliance officer from making a warrantless inspection, the Court had no occasion to decide

whether the exclusionary rule applied to evidence obtained in violation of the warrant requirement. See id. at 310.
16. Secretary of Labor v. Sarasota Concrete Co., 9 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1608 (Rev. Comm'n
1981), aff'd, Donovan v. Sarasota Concrete Co., 693 F.2d 1061 (l1th Cir. 1982).
17. The trend is toward accepting the exclusionary rule in OSHA proceedings. See
Donovan v. Federal Clearing Die Casting Co. & OSHRC, 695 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir. 1982);
Donovan v. Sarasota Concrete Co., 693 F.2d 1061 (l1th Cir. 1982).
For an excellent discussion of reasons for applying the exclusionary rule in OSHA proceedings, see Trant, OSHA and the Exclusionary Rule: Should the Employer Go Free Because the Compliance Officer Has Blundered?, 1981 DUKE L.J. 667. See generally Note, The
Exclusionary Rule in Administrative Proceedings, 2 CONN. L. REV. 648 (1970) (predicting that
the exclusionary rule would be applied in administrative hearings that contemplate imposing
fines or penalties for violation of laws or regulations); Note, The Applicability of the Exclusionary Rule in Administrative Adjudicatory Proceedings, 66 IOWA L. REv. 343 (1981)

(suggesting a balancing of the searched party's fourth amendment rights and governmental
interests in administrative proceedings that includes a consideration of the deterrent effect
suppression would have on governmental misconduct).
18. See infra notes 157-171 and accompanying text.
19. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 538 (White, J., dissenting), reh'g denied, 429 U.S.
874 (1976). See also Ball, Good Faith and the Fourth Amendment: The "Reasonable" Exception to the Exclusionary Rule. 69 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 635, 635 (1978) (providing
historical background on the good faith exception doctrine).
20. See infra text accompanying notes 58-90. See also United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d
830, 840 (5th Cir. 1980) (en bane) (adopting a sweeping good faith exception), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1127 (1981).
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THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AND THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION
IN THE CaMimNAL SETrING

At common law and during the early development of American constitutional law, the source of evidence was a collateral issue which did not affect
its admissibility at trial.2 1 In 1914, however, the United States Supreme Court
rejected this position in Weeks v. United States.22 Weeks held evidence seized
in violation of the fourth amendment inadmissible in federal criminal prose23
cutions.

Weeks had been convicted of using the mail to transport lottery tickets on
the basis of evidence seized by a federal marshal in a warrantless search of his
home. 24 The Court held admission of this evidence at trial was prejudicial
error. 25 The Court offered two rationales for its exclusionary rule. A person's
fourth amendment right to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures
embraces the right not to have evidence obtained in an unreasonable search
used against him.26 In addition, the integrity of the courts would suffer if they
permitted the use of unconstitutionally obtained evidence.27
In 1949, the Supreme Court held the fourth amendment enforceable against

21. C. McCombncx, supra note 1, § 165.
The underlying philosophy of the exclusionary rule first surfaced in Boyd v. United States,
116 US. 616 (1886). Boyd declared unconstitutional a statute authorizing courts to treat
failure to produce business papers in revenue cases as a confession. Id. The Court found
the statute repugnant to the fourth and fifth amendments. Id. at 632. For an analysis of
Boyd, see J. LANDYNsna, supra note 2, at 49-61.
22. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
23. Id. at 398.
24. Id. at 386. Actually, two warrantless searches of Weeks' home were made: one by
the local police alone and one by the police with a federal marshal. Id. Since the fourth
amendment was not considered applicable to the states when Weeks was decided, the Weeks
decision dealt only with the evidence obtained in the search in which the federal marshal
took part. Id. at 398.
25. Id. at 398.
26. The Court stated:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence
against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment declaring
his right to be secure against such searches and seizures is of no value, and, so far
as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution.
Id. at 893. Later cases have affirmed the constitutional right rationale for the exclusionary
rule. See, e.g., McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 339-40 (1943); Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 462 (1928); Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 29-30 (1927).
27. the Court stated:
The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions, the latter often
obtained after subjecting accused persons to unwarranted practices destructive of
rights secured by the Federal Constitution, should find no sanction in the judgments
of the courts, which are charged at all times with the support of the Constitution and
to which people of all conditions have a right to appeal for the maintenance of such
fundamental rights.
232 US. at 392.
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the States, 28 but refused to impose the exclusionary sanction upon state proceedings. 29 The Court characterized exclusion of illegally obtained evidence as
a judicially-created remedy rather than a constitutional right.30 Though the
majority conceded that the exclusionary rule might deter unreasonable
searches, it concluded that the states should be free to fashion alternative
remedies for fourth amendment violations.Al
For nearly fifty years the exclusionary rule was required only in federal
courts.32 Then, in Mapp v. Ohio33 the Court retreated from its position that
the exclusionary rule need not be imposed on the states.3 4 Mapp held that the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires the exclusion of
evidence seized in contravention of the fourth amendment.3 5 The Court
justified extending the exclusionary rule to state proceedings by declaring it
an "essential part" of the fourth amendment.3 6 As in Weeks, the Court declared
that judicial integrity required exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of
the fourth amendment. 3 7 The Court also stressed the rule's deterrent purpose
and the futility of alternative remedies. 38 Because the Court proposed several
justifications for the exclusionary rule, no one rationale emerged as the sole
basis for the Mapp decision.3 9

28. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949). Justice Frankfurter, writing for the
majority stated: "The security oE one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the policewhich is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society. It is therefore
implicit in 'the concept of ordered liberty' and as such enforceable against the States through
the Due Process Clause." Id.
29. Id. at 33.
30. Id. at 30-31.
31. See id. at 28, 31-32. But see id. at 40 (Douglas, J. dissenting); id. at 41 (Murphy, J.,
dissenting). Both dissents emphasized the futility of alternative remedies.
32. Originally the rule applied in federal trials only to evidence obtained unlawfully by
federal officials. E.g., Lustig v. United States, 538 U.S. 74, 78-79 (1949) (exclusionary rule
operates only when federal officials are involved in fourth amendment violations); Byars v.
United States, 273 U.S. 28, 3 (1927) (evidence excluded only when federal agents participate
in the wrongful search and seizure); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921) (since
the federal government had nothing to do with the wrongful seizure by private individuals,
the exclusionary rule does not apply); Weeks v. United States, 232 US. 383, 398 (1914) (evidence obtained by federal marshal in violation of defendant's fourth amendment right is inadmissible in federal criminal courts).
33. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
34. Id. at 655.
35. Id. Justice Clark, for the plurality, wrote: "Since the Fourth Amendment's right of
privacy has been declared enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as is used
against the Federal Government." Id.
36. Id. at 657.
37. Id. at 660.
38. Id. at 658-59.
39. See Schrock & Welsh, Up From Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional
Requirement, 59 MINN. L. Rav. 251, 264 (1974) (stating the Mapp Court "relied on an unstable combination of arguments"); Sunderland, The Exclusionary Rule: A Requirement
of Constitutional Principle, 69 J. Cias. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 141, 144-45 (1978) (arguing the
lack of "a clear, persuasive, principled rationale in Mapp" has aided critics of the exclusionary
rule). See generally I W. LAFAvE, supra note 1, § 1.1(e)-(f).
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EMERGENCE OF DETERRFCE AS THE PRIMARY
PURPOSE OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RuLE

Decisions since Mapp have narrowed the scope of the exclusionary rule in
criminal proceedings. 40 Only one of the purported goals of the exclusionary
rule retains vitality: deterrence of police misconduct.4 ' Just four years after
Mapp, in Linkletter v. Walker,42 the Court adopted the deterrence theory as the
43
primary rationale for the exclusionary sanction.
Linkletter involved the habeas corpus petition of a state prisoner whose
conviction rested on evidence illegally seized prior to the Mapp decision.- The
Linkletter Court consequently had to decide whether Mapp should be applied
retroactively.5 After surveying the history of retroactivity, the Court decided
it was "neither required to apply, nor prohibited from applying, a decision
retrospectively." 46 The Court suggested that the question of applying the rule

retrospectively depended upon whether such application would advance or
retard the rule's intended effect.47 Finding the primary purpose for extending
the exclusionary sanction to state courts was deterrence of police misconduct,
the Court decided that this purpose would not be furthered by applying the
sanction retrospectively. 4 The police misconduct already done would not be
corrected by releasing the prisoner involved.49
Dissenting Justice Black rejected the majority's proposition that the exclusionary rule was intended to do nothing more than deter illegal police
action. 50 Mapp described the rule as "implicit in the concept of ordered
40. See infra text accompanying notes 41-90.
41. Although the Supreme Court views deterrence of police misconduct as the primary
purpose of the exclusionary rule, many commentators disagree. See, e.g., Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. lxv. 349, 431-33 (1974) (arguing that the exclusionary sanction is the only effective way of honoring the fourth amendment); Schrock &
Welsh, supra note 39, at 372 (characterizing the exclusionary rule as a personal constitutional
right arising from the fourth amendment and the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments); Sunderland, supra note 39, at 159 (arguing that due process requires exclusion
of illegally seized evidence).

42. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
43. Id. at 636.
44. Id. at 621.
45. The Court noted that the Mapp rule was applied to reverse defendant Mapp's conviction and had been applied to cases still pending on direct review when Mapp was decided.
Thus, the Court was faced with a limited question: whether the exclusionary rule should be
applied retroactively to state court convictions which had become final before Mapp was
handed down. Id. at 622.
46. Id. at 629.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 636-37.
49. Id. The Court also stated that the delicate relationship between state and federal
courts would be disrupted by retroactive application of Mapp. Id.
50. Id. at 649 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black noted that if the majority were
correct, and the exclusionary rule is not a right or privilege, but a remedy, the Court's imposition of the exclusionary rule on the states in Mapp was more "like law-making than
construing the Constitution." Id. See also Ball, supra note 19, at 651. Professor Ball states that
if the exclusionary sanction is merely a judicially-created remedial device, it may be argued
that the states should be left free to fashion their own remedies. Id. For further discussion
of this view see Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HAuv.
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liberty"51- and an "essential. ingredient" of the constitutional guarantee 52 of
the fourth amendment. Justice Black vigorously condemned the Court's refusal
to give petitioner the new and more expansive interpretation of the fourth
amendment in Mapp. 5s
The Supreme Court reaffirmed deterrence as the primary rationale for the
exclusionary rule in United States v. Calandra.54 The Calandramajority refused
to apply the exclusionary rule in grand jury proceedings. Describing the rule
as a judicially-created remedy designed to protect fourth amendment rights
through deterrence, the Court rejected the constitutional right and judicial
integrity justifications for the rule. 55 Since it viewed deterrence as the primary
purpose for the exclusionary rule, the Court held the rule need not apply
unless the deterrent goal would be significantly advanced.56 Thus, the Court
adopted a balancing test requiring the deterrent effect of the exclusionary
sanction to be weighed against the societal costs of exclusion.57
SUPREME COURT SUPPORT FOR THE
GOOD FAITH ExcEPTION DOCTRINE

By establishing deterrence as the primary rationale for the exclusionary
rule, the Court opened the door to legitimizing the emerging good faith doctrine
and thereby weakening the rule's effectiveness. 58 If the purpose for applying the
sanction is to deter official misconduct, the future impact of its application must
L. REv. 1532, 1561 (1972); Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89
REV. 1,2-6 (1975).

HARv. L.

51. 581 US. at 649.
52. Id. at 650.
53. See id. at 646. Justice Black pointed out that in the past the Supreme Court had
afforded previously convicted defendants the benefits of a new and more liberal reading of the
Bill of Rights. Id. See, e.g., Fay v. Nola, 572 U.S. 591 (1963) (defendant granted habeas corpus
twenty-one years after his conviction based on a coerced confession).
54. 414 U.S. 58 (1974).
55. See id. at 551-52.
56. See id. at 549-52.
57. See id. at 349. The high price society pays for the application of the exclusionary rule
in criminal trials is "the release of countless guilty criminals." Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents, 403 US. 588, 416 (Burger. C.J., dissenting). See also Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1055-06 (1974). Professor Kaplan argues that frustration
of the public when criminals are freed is a "cost of the exclusionary rule." Id.
Societal costs may not be as high as the Chief Justice and Professor Kaplan imply. A study
conducted by the Comptroller General of the United States shows that the rule rarely frees
federal criminal suspects. Of the 2,804 cases surveyed, only 0.4% were declined by the federal
prosecutors because of fourth amendment problems. Evidence was excluded at trial in only
1.5% of the cases and over half of the defendants whose suppression motions were granted
were nevertheless convicted. Siegel, Law Enforcement and Civil Liberties: We Can Have
Both, Crv. LI., Feb. 1983, at 5, 5-6 (citing Report by the Comptroller General of the United
States, "Impact of the Exclusionary Rule on Federal Criminal Prosecutions," Apr. 19, 1979).
In another survey, the National Institute of Justice found that between 1976 and 1979, only
4.8% of all felony arrests in California were rejected for prosecution because of fourth
amendment problems. Seventy-five percent of these felonies were drug related, not crimes of
violence. Id. at 6 (citing U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, "The Effects
of the Exclusionary Rule: A Study of California," Dec., 1982).
58. See Ball, supranote 19, at 650.
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be considered. There is no deterrence potential in suppressing evidence obtained by an official who acted in the reasonable and good faith belief that his
conduct was legal.6 9 Thus, good faith violations provide a class of cases in
which suppression is arguably inappropriate.6°
Since Calandra,61the Court has refused to apply the exclusionary rule when
it has determined the societal costs of exclusion outweigh the benefits of the
rule.6 2 Several cases following Calandra laid the foundation for the emerging
good faith exception.63 Although these cases were not decided on good faith
grounds, they presented the Court opportunities to discuss the good faith
doctrine.
In one case, the majority stated that the exclusionary sanction should be
applied only when the police have engaged in "willful, or at the very least
negligent conduct which had deprived the defendant of some right."64 By excluding evidence obtained in obvious violation of constitutional guarantees,
the majority believed officers would be deterred from such misconduct.65 However, when the official conduct was undertaken in good faith, the Court con66
cluded the deterrence rationale loses much of its force.
In another decision, the Court abandoned the judicial integrity rationale for
the exclusionary rule in cases involving good faith police action. Judicial integrity would not be compromised so long as officers acted under a reasonable
belief that a seizure was legal, even though subsequent judicial decisions held
the seizure unconstitutional. 67 Courts would not be considered accomplices in
the willful disobedience of the Constitution if there was no willful disobedience
by the police.6s The Court concluded that evidence obtained from a search
59. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 540 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
60. Ball, supra note 19, at 650.
61. See supra text accompanying notes 54-57.
62. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531
(1975); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
63. Ball, supra note 19, at 651.
64. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974). In Tucker, a suspect was arrested for
rape and questioned by police without being advised of his right to counsel if he was
indigent. Id. at 435. He told the police that he had been with a friend at the time of the
rape. By questioning his friend the police gained information that incriminated the defendant. Id. The defendant moved to suppress his friend's testimony on the basis that he had
revealed the friend's identity without receiving full Miranda warnings. The interrogation had
occurred prior to the Miranda decision. The defendant was convicted, but subsequently
granted habeas corpus relief. The court of appeals affirmed, but the Supreme Court reversed,
finding no reason to exclude relevant testimony by a third-party witness. The Court concluded that the failure of police to give all the warnings had no bearing on the reliability of
the friend's testimony. Id. at 448-49.
65. Id. at 447.
66. Id. According to Professor Ball, the Tucker opinion is significant because it demonstrated the new willingness of several Justices to consider the "nature of the illegality when
determining the applicability of the exclusionary rule." Ball, supra note 19, at 652.
67. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 536 (1975) (quoting Elkins v. United States,
364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960)). In Peltier the Court permitted the admission of evidence that had
been obtained in a warrantless border search under a statutory construction later held unconstitutional in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973). 422 U.S. at 541-42.
68. United States v. Peltier, 422 US. 531, 536 (1975) (quoting Elkins v. United States,
364 US. 206, 223 (1960)).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol35/iss4/7

8

Perfit: The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule in OSHA Proceed
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXV

should be excluded only if the seizing officers knew or had reason to know that
the search was unconstitutional. G0
In a later case, the issue of good faith was addressed by Justice Powell in
his concurring opinion.70 To combat what he considered the overreaching of
the exclusionary rule, Justice Powell suggested a sliding scale approach for
assessing police misconduct.7L At one end of the scale he placed flagrant violations, such as pretext arrests and other unnecessarily intrusive invasions of
privacy.72 He urged that evidence obtained in such flagrant disregard for
constitutional guarantees should be excluded at trial7 At the other end of
the scale were technical violations, such as an officer relying on a statute later
declared unconstitutional or upon a warrant subsequently invalidated. 74 Justice
Powell proposed that technical violations, committed in good faith, should
not trigger the exclusion of evidence.75
Stone v. Powel176 provided a forum for further analysis of the good faith
doctrine. Although the facts of Stone raised the issue of good faith, the majority
opinion failed to address it.77 However, both Chief Justice Burger's concurrence
and Justice White's dissent focused on the good faith issue. As had Justice
Powell, Justice Burger criticized the overreaching of the exclusionary rule.75
69. 422 U.S. at 542. Thus, Peltier provides that the exclusionary rule is not retroactively
applied in fourth amendment cases unless the officers involved in the illegal search knew or
should have known that their actions were unconstitutional. Id.
70. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 606-16 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part). Brown
involved an illegal arrest made without a warrant or probable cause. After being taken to the
police station, petitioner made two incriminating statements concerning a murder. Petitioner
later moved to suppress the statements because they had been obtained through illegal arrest
and detention. His motion was denied and he was subsequently convicted of murder. The
Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the conviction, stating petitioner's receipt of the Miranda
warnings made his statements admissible, 56 I1. 2d 312, 307 N.E.2d 356 (1974). On certiorari,
the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, declaring receipt of Miranda warnings did not per
se make the statements admissible. 422 U.S. at 605.
71. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring).
72. Id. at 610-11.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 611.
75. See id. at 612.
76. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
77. Petitioner's conviction in part rested on testimony concerning a revolver found on his
person when he was arrested for violating a vagrancy ordinance. Id. at 469-70. At trial he
argued that the testimony should have been excluded because the ordinance in question was
unconstitutional, and therefore the arrest was invalid. The trial court rejected his argument and
the state appellate court affirmed the conviction finding it unnecessary to rule on the
constitutional question because the error, if any, was harmless. Id. Petitioner then applied to
federal district court for habeas corpus relief. The district court concluded that even if the
ordinance was unconstitutional, the exclusionary rule's deterrent purpose does not require
exclusion of evidence obtained in a search incident to an otherwise valid arrest. Id.
The court of appeals held that the ordinance was unconstitutional, therefore the arrest
was illegal, and the exclusionary rule should apply. Id. at 571. The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that "where the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a
Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on
the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at
his trial." Id. at 494.
78. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
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He suggested that if the "judicially contrived doctrine" was overruled or
limited to bad faith violations, legislatures would be encouraged to provide a
sufficient remedy for police mistakes or misconduct.79 Justice Burger also
recognized two categories of good faith violations: good faith technical violations and good faith mistakes.80 In his dissent, Justice White further analyzed
these two categories. Previous discussion of good faith violations had focused
primarily upon technical violations as defined by Justice Powell.8 ' Justice
White examined the second category of good faith violations, the good faith
mistake.8 2 Good faith mistakes involve judgmental errors that may or may not
be reasonable.83 Justice White maintained that police misconduct would not
be deterred by excluding evidence obtained through a mistaken but good faith
judgment that the procedure followed was legal.84
In 1979 the Supreme Court implicitly recognized a good faith exception
85
to the exclusionary rule for technical violations in Michigan v. DeFillipo.
After arresting the defendant for an ordinance violation, the police searched
him and found controlled substances.88 He was subsequently charged with
possession and convicted.8 7 In an interlocutory appeal, the Michigan court of
appeals held the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague. The court thus
found the arrest and search invalid 88 and ordered the evidence suppressed. The
United States Supreme Court reversed, stating police must be allowed to enforce laws until and unless they are declared unconstitutional.9 The Court
held that evidence obtained by the police in good faith and reasonable reliance on the statute should not have been suppressed. 90
TH Firm Ciacurr's RECOGNITION

OF A SWEEPING

GoOD FAITH EXCEPTION
In 1980, the Fifth Circuit accepted both the good faith technical violation
and the good faith mistake exceptions to the exclusionary rule in United States
79.
80.
81.
82.

428 U.S. at 501 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
See id. at 499.
See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
428 U.S. at 539 (White, J., dissenting).

83. Ball, supra note 19, at 653.
84. 428 U.S. at 540.
85. 443 U.S. 31 (1979). Accord United States v. Carden, 529 F.2d 443 (5th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 848 (1976) (upholding an arrest and search made in good faith reliance on a
loitering statute); United States v. Kilgen, 445 F.2d 287 (5th Cir. 1971) (upholding a con-

fession resulting from a good faith arrest based on a statute subsequently declared unconstitutional).
86. 443 US. at 34.
87. Id.

88. 80 Mich. App. 197, 202-03, 262 N.W.2d 921, 924 (1977), rev'd, 443 U.S. 31 (1979).
89. 443 US. at 38. The Court believed that the police relied on the statute. Id. at 36.
But see id. at 41, 42 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall and Stevens, J.J., dissenting). The dissent
suggested that the majority erred in focusing on the good faith of the arresting officers and
the reasonableness of their reliance on the ordinance's validity. The dissenters thought the
ultimate issue was whether the State had gathered its evidence through unconstitutional

means. Id. at 43.
90. Id.at4D.
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v. Williams.", While searching the defendant pursuant to her arrest for violating a court order restricting her travel, 92 a drug enforcement agent found heroin
in defendant's possession. 93 At trial the defendant challenged the validity of the
arrest and the subsequent search.9 4 Thirteen of the twenty-four Fifth Circuit
judges believed the agent's reasonable and good faith belief that he was
authorized to arrest the defendant should be taken into consideration.- This
bare majority agreed that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter
willful or flagrant police misconduct, not action taken in the reasonable and
good faith belief it was constitutional.96 In their view, the exclusionary sanction
should not be used when an officer acts in the good faith belief that his conduct
is legal and he has a reasonable basis for that belief. 97 The good faith exception
recognized in Williams included both good faith mistakes and good faith
technical violations.

98

91. 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981). Two
opinions commanded a majority in Williams. Part I found that the agent had been justified
in arresting defendant on grounds of statutory interpretation. Id. at 839. Part II held that
even if the agent had not been authorized to make the arrest, his good faith and reasonable
belief that he had been authorized to do so ought to have been considered. Id. at 846-47. For
a thorough discussion of the Williams decision, see Note, Is It Time For a Change in the
Exclusionary Rule, United States v. Williams and the Good Faith Exception, 60 WASH. U.L.Q.
616 (1982); Comment, Constitutional Law: The Fifth Circuit's Good Faith Exception to the
Exclusionary Rule- Well-reached or Overreached?, 33 U. FLA. L. REv. 300 (1981).
92. 622 F.2d at 834. The same agent had arrested Williams a year earlier for possession
of heroin in Ohio. The trial court sentenced her to three years imprisonment. She then
appealed to the Sixth Circuit, which ordered her released pending appeal, provided she remained in Ohio. The agent knew of these court-imposed travel restrictions when he saw her
in the Atlanta airport. Id. at 833-34. He approached her and asked whether she had received
permission to leave Ohio. She responded "No." When asked why she was heading for
Kentucky via Atlanta, she answered "I live there now." Id. at 834. The agent then arrested her,
believing he had the authority to do so. Id.
93. Id. He then obtained a search warrant for defendant's luggage and found more
heroin. Id. at 834-35.
94. Williams argued the arrest was invalid because the statute authorizing drug enforcement agents to make warrantless arrests does not grant them the power to arrest individuals
for contempt. Id. at 835. Agreeing with Williams, the Fifth Circuit panel originally hearing
the appeal held "[a] court, not a DEA agent, is empowered by 18 U.S.C. § 401(3) to punish
disobedience or contempt of its order by fine or imprisonment." United States v. Williams, 594
F.2d 86, 92 (5th Cir. 1979), rev'd on reh'g, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (emphasis
in original). The panel then concluded, "DEA agents, therefore, have no implied arrest power
under § 401." Id. at 93. On rehearing en banc, the Fifth Circuit reversed the panel's decision.
622 F.2d at 833.
95. 622 F.2d at 840.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See id. at 843-47. See generally Comment, Criminal Procedure- Exclusionary Rule "Good Faith" Exception - The Exclusionary Rule Will Not Operate in Circumstances
Where the Officer's Violation Was Committed in the Reasonable, Good Faith Belief that
His Actions Were Legal, 27 VILL. L. REv. 211, 222 (1982) (arguing that the Fifth Circuit's
articulation of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule is a much needed step forward
in the area of criminal law). But see Mertens & Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to
the Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEO. L.J. 365, 416
(1981) (arguing that the facts of Williams did not support the sweeping exception the court
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By adopting a sweeping good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, the
Williams majority claimed to be following the trend set by the Supreme
Court. 0 Since Williams, however, no other courts have gone so far.100 Whether
the Supreme Court will recognize such a general exception to the exclusionary
rule in the criminal context is uncertain.10 ' The analysis of whether the good
faith exception should be adopted in OSHA proceedings must be preceded by
a discussion of administrative search law.
fashioned). Professors Mertens and Wasserstrom predict that the good faith exception may

ultimately alter the definition of fourth amendment rights. Id. at 463.
99. See 622 F.2d at 841.
100. A few state courts have applied the good faith exception in limited circumstances,
but without adopting the broad rule articulated by the Fifth Circuit in Williams. See People
v. Adams, 53 N.Y.2d 1, 9, 422 N.E.2d 537, 541, 439 N.Y.S.2d 877, 881, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 854
(1981) (evidence need not be excluded when seized by police officer under the mistaken belief
that the person consenting to the search had authority to do so). Other courts have cited
Williams as the most recent development in exclusionary rule doctrine, but have stopped
short of applying it. See, e.g., Robberson Steel Co. v. OSHRC, 645 F.2d 22, 22 (10th Cir.
1980) (decision based on retroactivity principles, but the court expressed approval of the
logic of Williams); People v. Eichelberger, Colo. -,
620 P.2d 1067, 1071 n.2 (1980)
(en banc) (the exclusionary rule is not intended to prevent police from carrying out their
duties when police action is reasonable); People v. Smith, Colo. -,
620 P-2d 232, 235 n.4
(1980) (exclusionary rule exists to deter willful, flagrant actions by police, not reasonable,
good faith ones); People v. Pierce, 88 Ill. App. 3d 1095, 1102, 1110, 411 NE.2d 195, 301, 307
(1980) (the court noted the Williams test of "reasonable and good faith belief by the police
in propriety of their conduct" was met by the state but decided the case on the "totality of
circumstances" present). But see Holloman v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 947, 950, 275 S.E.2d
620, 622 (1981) (although persuaded by Williams' logic, the court held the good faith exception inapplicable when police search places that could not reasonably contain objects of
the search). Other courts have refused to consider the good faith exception because the
highest court within the jurisdiction has not yet given approval. Eg., Pesci v. State, 410
So. 2d 380 (Fla. 3d D.CA. 1982) (court refused to consider the exception until the Florida
Supreme Court has recognized it).
101. The Supreme Court had the opportunity to carve out a good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule in Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983). In Gates, police obtained a
warrant to search defendants' car and home. Probable cause for issuance of the warrant was
based primarily on an anonymous letter to the police alleging that defendants were planning
to go to Florida to purchase marijuana. Id. at -.
When the case was first argued before the Supreme Court last fall, it provided the Justices
an opportunity to decide when police may use an anonymous tip to establish probable cause
for issuance of a search warrant. Lauter, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 14, 1983, at 6, col. 1. Instead of deciding the case on the question whether there was probable cause to support the warrant,
however, the Court rescheduled the case for argument on the issue of the good faith exception.
Id.
When the Supreme Court again heard arguments it became apparent that Illinois v. Gates
might not be the right case for re-examining the scope of the exclusionary rule. The Illinois
Assistant Attorney General refused to argue for the good faith exception. Instead he urged
that the "totality of the circumstances" in the case justified the magistrate's "reasonable belief" that there was probable cause for issuance of the warrant. U.S. Solicitor General Roy
E. Lee representing the Reagan administration's views on the case argued, "once a warrant
has been issued, execution of it should be considered 'reasonable' and thus evidence obtained
by it should be admissible." He went on to add that in the administration's view there was
probable cause for the warrant. Justice Stevens summed up the problem with the Solicitor
General's argument: if the warrant was issued with probable cause, there was no reason
to consider suppression; but if probstble ca#se was lacking, the warrant clearly violated the
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THE H [STORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF
ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCH LAW

In Camarav. Municipal Court,10 2 the Supreme Court imposed the warrant
requirement on residential inspections made pursuant to city fire, health, and
housing codes.'1 3 Until Camara, the Court had considered privacy interests
affected by municipal code inspections "peripheral" to interests protected by
the Constitution. 0 4 Camara involved a city health inspector's attempt to inspect a private home without a warrant. 10 5 The Court acknowledged that an
inspection for municipal code violations was less intrusive than a typical
criminal search; however, the Court refused to endorse its prior characterization
of the fourth amendment rights involved as "peripheral."' 0 Instead, the
majority insisted that, except in certain circumstances, a search of private
property without consent is unconstitutional unless authorized by a valid
search warrant.107 Concerned that warrantless administrative searches would
subject individuals to the sole discretion of administrative officials, the Court
held the warrant requirement applied. 10 8
The majority was unwilling, however, to require the same probable cause
standard for issuance of administrative search warrants as traditionally required
for criminal search warrants. 0 9 The Camara Court recognized that administrative searches are conducted to protect the public and are generally less intrusive
than criminal searches.110 Thus the Court allowed a lower standard for the
Constitution. In either case, the issue of good faith is irrelevant. Id. at 6, cal. 8. The case was
ultimately decided on the Illinois Assistant Attorney's argument that the "totality of circumstances" justified issuance of the search warrant. 462 U.S. at 102. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). For an analysis of Camara and its companion case, See v. City of
Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) and their effect on fourth amendment rights, see LaFave, Administrative Searches and the Fourth Amendment: The Camara and See Cases, 1967 Sop.
CT. REV. 1.

103. See 387 U.S. at 534.
104. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 367 (1959). In Frank the Supreme Court upheld
the conviction of defendant who had refused to permit a municipal health official to conduct
a warrantless search of his home. Id. at 373. The dissent by Justice Douglas, with whom Chief
Justice Warren, and Justices Black and Brennan concurred, argued that rights affected by
warrantless inspections were not peripheral and that warrants, therefore, should be required.
Id. at 375.
105. 887 U.S. at 525.
106. Id. at 530. Writing for the Court, Justice White declared: "It is surely anomalous to say
that the individual and his private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment
only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior." Id.
107. Id. at 528-29.
108. Id. at 534. Since the warrant requirement applies to such inspections, the defendant
could not be prosecuted for denying the city official access to his home without a warrant.
Id. at 546.
109. Id. at 538. "Where considerations of health and safety are involved, the facts that
would justify an inference of 'probable cause' to make an inspection are clearly different from
those that would justify such an inference where a criminal investigation has been undertaken." Id. (citing Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 383 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
In Camara, the Court was trying to balance the privacy interests of individuals against the
remedial purposes of administrative inspections. See LaFave, supra note 102, at 19.
110. 887 U.S. at 537-38.
111. Id. at 539.
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probable cause necessary to issue warrants in an administrative context. In
addition, the Court announced that the emergency exception to the warrant
requirement recognized in the criminal context would also apply in the ad-

ministrative area."1
The Court extended its Camara reasoning to commercial property in a
case decided the same day, See v. City of Seattle.. 2 The defendant was convicted for refusing to permit a city fire department official to inspect his warehouse." 3 The official had no warrant and there was no probable cause to believe any fire code violations existed in the warehouse."14 Holding the warrant
requirement applicable, the Court declared that a businessman has the same
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable official invasions of his

private commercial property as an individual has regarding his private residential property." s The defendant therefore could not be prosecuted for

exercising his fourth amendment right to demand a warrant authorizing inspection of his warehouse.16
After Camara and See, the Supreme Court carved out an exception to the
warrant requirement when the industry to be inspected has historically been
highly regulated. The Court upheld two warrantless searches despite the

absence of probable cause or exigent circumstances.21 7 The first case in which
the Supreme Court applied the exception to the Camara/Seestandard involved
a search in the liquor industry;"s8 the second case involved a firearms industry

search." 9 In each case, the Court noted that the industry
under inspection
20
supervision.
governmental
close
to
subject
been
long
had
112.
113.
114.
115.

287 U.S. 541 (1967).
Id.
Id.
Id. The Court stated:

As we explained in Camara, a search of private houses is presumptively unreasonable
if conducted without a warrant. The businessman, like the occupant of a residence,
has a constitutional right to go about his business free from unreasonable official
entries upon his private commercial property. The businessman, too, has that right
placed in jeopardy if the decision to enter and inspect for violation of regulatory laws
can be made and enforced by the inspector in the field without official authority
evidenced by warrant.
Id. at 543.
116. 387 U.S. at 546.
117. See Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 597 U.S. 72 (1970); United States
v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
118. Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 297 U.S. 72 (1970).
119. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
120. Id. at 315; Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 US. 72, 77 (1970). In
addition to echoing the "pervasively regulated" argument of Colonnade, the Biswell Court said
firearms dealers impliedly consent to warrantless searches when they apply for a federal
license. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972).
After Colonnade and Biswell, there was some concern that the Camara/See doctrine would
be swallowed up by exceptions. See, e.g., Rothstein & Rothstein, Administrative Searches and
Seizures: What Happened to Camara and See?, 50 WASH. L. REv. 341 (1975); Note, The Law
of Administrative Inspections: Are Camara and See Still Alive and Well?, 1972 WAsH. U.L.Q.
313. For a discussion questioning the soundness of the "pervasively regulated" industry ex-
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Although both decisions involved federal statutory schemes authorizing
warrantless inspections,121 it was not solely deference to congressional inspection
schemes that persuaded the Court to create an exception to the Camara/See
doctrine.122 The Court apparently intended to make an exception only for
"pervasively regulated" industries123 Thus in Marshall v. Barlow's,124
the

Court declared unconstitutional section 8(a) of O.S.H.A.125 which purported
to authorize warrantless inspections of all businesses subject to the Act. 2 6
Barlow's will be considered more closely following an examination of the
relevant provisions of the Act.
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AND THE GOOD FAITH

EXCEPTION IN THE

OSHA SETTING

Congress passed O.S.H.A. to curb industrial accidents and health hazards.

Testifying during Senate hearings on the proposed legislation, former Labor
Secretary George P. Schultz stated that 14,000 workers died and 22 million were
disabled by job-related accidents each year.1 27 An estimated 1.5 billion dollars
in wages and 8 billion dollars in the gross national product were lost because
28
of these deaths and accidents1
ception, see Note, Rationalizing Administrative Searches, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1291,
(1979).
121. The statute in Colonnade provided:

1330-31

"The Secretary or his delegate may enter during business hours the premises (including
places of storage) of any dealer for the purpose of inspecting or examining any records
or other documents required to be kept by such dealer under this chapter or regulations issued pursuant thereto and any distilled spirits, wines, or beer kept or stored
by such dealer on such premises."
26 U.S.C. § 5146(b) (1976).
In Biswell, the statute was the Gun Control Act of 1968, which provides in part:
The Secretary may enter during business hours the premises (including places of
storage) of any firearms or ammunition importer, manufacturer, dealer, or collector
for the purpose of inspecting or examining (1) any records or documents required to
be kept by such importer, manufacturer, dealer, or collector under the provision of
this chapter or regulations issued under this chapter, and (2) any firearms or ammunition kept or stored by such importer, manufacturer, dealer, or collector at such
premises.
18 U.S.C. § 923(g) (1976).
122. See infra notes 123-26 and accompanying texts.
123. See, e.g., Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861, 864-65
(1974) (expressly reaffirming Camara and See while finding them inapplicable); AlmeidaSanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 270 (1973) (reaffrming Camara and concluding that
roving border searches presented the same "evil" of unabridged discretion as was found
in Camara).
124. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
125. 29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1976).
126. 436 U.S. at 325. For text of section 657(a) see supra note 13.
127. THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., THE JOB SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1970
at 13 (1971).
128. Id. It had become increasingly apparent that advances in technology were creating
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O.S.H.A. mandates a safe working environment for almost every employee
in the country. 129 It directs the Secretary of Labor to issue and enforce safety
and health regulations for all businesses affecting interstate commerce. The Act
requires that an employer "furnish to each of his employees employment and a
place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing
or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees."" 0 In
addition, employers must comply with the occupational safety and health
standards promulgated under the Act13 ' and maintain safety-related records as
required by the Secretary of Labor."2
To enforce the prescribed safety and health standards, OSHA can conduct
inspections either on its own initiative or upon an employee's request. 33 Upon
finding a violation, OSHA must issue the employer a citation with "reasonable
promptness" 1 4 and state the proposed penalty."35 If an employer contests the
citation or proposed penalty or if an employee contests the reasonableness of
the period for abatement of the violation, an administrative law judge will
hear the case.13 Initial discretionary review is by the OSHRC." 3 OSHRC decisions may be appealed to a circuit court of appeals, whose decisions may be
reviewed by the United States Supreme Court.' ss

additional safety and health hazards in the workplace. Lead and mercury poisoning, asbestosis,
and byssinosis affected a substantial number of workers. Id. at 13, 14. The Public Health
Service estimated that three new, potentially dangerous chemicals were introduced into industry every hour. Id. at 14. Like their counterparts in industry, farm workers felt the effects
of technology, and suffered from the effects of newly developed pesticides, herbicides, and
fungicides. Id.
129. The impact of the Act falls directly on those included in its definition of "employer."
For the purposes of the Act, employer means "a person engaged in a business affecting commerce who has employees, but does not include the United States or any state or political
subdivision of a state." Id. at 6. The phrase "affecting commerce" has been given a broad
construction. Id. If raw materials, power, or communications cross state lines in the pro-

duction of goods, the business is deemed covered by O.S.H.A. Id. at 6-7.
Because the terms of the Act are so broad, it covers almost every commercial establishment in the United States. By one estimate, almost 80% of the nation's work force is covered
by the Act. Shaffer, Job Health and Safety, 1976 EDITORIAL RESEARCH REPORTS 953, 963 cited
in Comment, OSHA v. The Fourth Amendment: Should Search Warrants be Required for
"Spot Check" Inspections?,29 BAYLOR L. REv. 283, 283 (1977).

130. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1976).
131. Id. § 654(a)(2).
132. Id. § 657(c)(1).
133. Id. § 657(a).
134. Id. § 658(a).
135. Id. § 666.
136. Id. § 659(c). This hearing must conform with the procedural requirements for adjudicatory hearings set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 US.C. § 554
(1976). See 29 US.C. § 659(c).
137. The OSHRC has the power to affirm, modify, or vacate the citation or proposed
penalty following the initial hearing conducted by the administrative judge. 29 U.S.C. § 659(c).
138. See 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) (1976). Any person adversely affected by an order of the OSHRC
may obtain judicial review in a United States Court of Appeals by filing within sixty days a
petition that the order be modified or set aside. Id. The Supreme Court's certiorari jurisdiction
is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1976).
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The Constitutionalityof OSHA Inspections
In Marshall v. Barlow's, defendants challenged the constitutionality of
O.S.H.A. section 8(a), 139 which allows OSHA compliance agents to search the
premises of any business within the Act's jurisdiction. 140 No search warrant or
other process is expressly required by the Act. Nevertheless, Barlow denied an
OSHA inspector admission to the nonpublic areas of his business premises,
relying on the fourth amendment as grounds for his refusal.141 The Secretary
of Labor argued that warrantless inspections to enforce the O.S.H.A. were
within the "pervasively regulated" industry exception. 142 The Supreme Court,
however, held section 8(a) unconstitutional "insofar as it purports to authorize
inspections without a warrant or its equivalent. ' 1'43 Citing Camara and See,
the majority stressed the fourth amendment rights of businessmen and the
need to limit the unbridled discretion that warrantless searches would afford
OSHA compliance officers.'14 The Court decided a warrant was necessary so
that a neutral magistrate might assure each inspection would be reasonable
under the Constitution. 14 5 A warrant would also describe the scope and objectives of the search.' 4 6
While recognizing the necessity of warrants to protect against unreasonable
searches, the Court nevertheless prescribed a lower standard of probable cause
for issuance of search warrants in the OSHA context. For routine OSHA inspections, a showing that the proposed inspection is pursuant to a neutral
legislative or administrative plan is sufficient. 147 For nonroutine inspections,
probable cause may be based on specific evidence of an existing violation.148
139. 29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1976).
140. See 436 U.S. 307, 325 (1978). For a discussion of the administrative search law
prior to Barlow's and the effect of Barlow's on employers' privacy rights, see Note, Marshall v.
Barlow's, Inc.: -Are Employers' Fourth Amendment Rights Protected?, 16 CAL. W.L. REv. 161
(1980); Comment, Constitutional Law- OSHA Searches: A Fourth Amendment Warrant Requirement, 30 U. FLA. L. REV. 991 (1978).
141. 436 U.S. at 309-10.
142. Id. at 313.
143. Id. at 325.
144. See id. at 322-23. See also Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 549 (1981) (upholding warrantless inspections required by the Mine Safety and Health Act). In Dewey, the Court considered
whether the Mine Safety and Health Act's inspection program provided an adequate substitute for a warrant. According to the Court, the certainty and regularity of the Act's inspection program sufficiently checked the discretion of government officers. Unlike O.S.H.A.,
the Mine Safety and Health Act requires inspection of all mines and specifically defines the
frequency of inspection. See also Note, Administrative Searches and the Fourth Amendment:
An Alternative to the Warrant Requirement, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 856 (1979) (proposing that
legislation for administrative inspections could be fashioned to provide the safeguards of the
warrant requirement without imposing the warrant requirement).
145. 436 U.S. at 323.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 320-21.
148. Id. at 320. The Court made no attempt to define the appropriate level of specificity
or certainty required for an OSHA inspection warrant in the nonroutine instance. See Note,
Administrative Agency Searches Since Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.: Probable Cause Requirements for Nonroutine Administrative Searches, 70 GEO. L.J. 1183, 1185 (1982) (arguing that
because nonroutine inspections involve high levels of discretion and intrusiveness, they should
be issued only if traditional probable cause exists).
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The Court did not address whether an employee complaint alleging a specific

violation would constitute probable cause for a full scope inspection.4 9 Lower
courts deciding this issue have reached conflicting results. Some have held
that a specific employee complaint should be enough to trigger a full scope
inspection.250 Other courts and the OSHRG have declared that an inspection
based on a specific complaint should be limited to finding out whether the

alleged violation actually exists. 151
Since the Barlow's decision in 1978, both courts and commentators have
speculated whether the exclusionary rule should apply to OSHA proceedings.

Two circuit courts have permitted evidence found in pre-Barlow's warrantless
searches to be introduced in OSHA proceedings.Ma However, their conclusions
diverge as to the applicability of the exclusionary rule in post-Barlow's cases.
One court questioned the applicability of the exclusionary rule in any OSHA

proceeding.163 The other expressly declared that the exclusionary rule would
149. Barlow's involved a routine inspection. 436 U.S. at 310. Thus, the question whether
a specific employee complaint presents sufficient probable cause for a full scope inspection
was not before the Court. Presumably, an employee complaint establishes administrative
probable cause of an existing violation. See, e.g., Blocksom & Co. v. Marshall, 582 F.2d 1122
(7th Cir. 1978). However, the complaint should not be considered in the abstract. If a
number of identical complaints had been received recently and in each instance an inspection
revealed no violations, there would be no probable cause. See generally Rothstein, OSHA
Inspections After Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 1979 Duax L.J. 63.
150. E.g., Hem Iron Works, Inc. v. Donovan, 670 F.2d 838 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 69 (1982); Burkart Randall Div. of Textron, Inc. v. Marshall, 625 F.2d 1313 (7th Cir.
1980); Establishment Inspection of Seaward Int'l, Inc. v. Seaward Int'l, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 314
(W.D. Va. 1980), aff'd, 644 F.2d 880 (4th Cir. 1981) (without opinion).
151. E.g., Donovan v. Sarasota Concrete Co., 693 F.2d 1061, 1069 (l1th Cir. 1982);
Marshall v. Horn Seed Co., 647 F.2d 96, 101 (10th Cir. 1981); Marshall v. North Am. Car Co.,
626 F.2d 320, 324 (3d Cir. 1980); Marshall v. Central Mine Equip. Co., 608 F.2d 719, 720-21 n.1
(8th Cir. 1979); In re Establishment Inspection of ASARCO, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 350, 353 (N.D.
Tex. 1981); West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. Marshall, 496 F. Supp. 1178, 1186 (N.D. Ga. 1980),
rev'd on other grounds, 689 F.2d 950 (l1th Cir. 1982); Marshall v. Pool Offshore Co., 467 F.
Supp. 978, 981-82 (W.D. La. 1979).
152. See Savina Home Indus. v. Secretary of Labor, 594 F.2d 1358 (10th Cir. 1979); Todd
Shipyards Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, 586 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1978). Both cases were decided
on general retroactivity principles concerning the exclusionary rule in the criminal content.
See United States v. Peltier, 422 US. 531 (1975); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 US. 618, 636-37
(1965). See generally Beytagh, Ten Years of Non-Retroactivity: A Critique and a Proposal, 61
VA. L. REv. 1557 (1975) (discussing the Court's unwillingness to apply the fourth amendment
retroactively).
153. Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, 586 F.2d 683, 689. The Ninth Circuit
concluded that since the Supreme Court in United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 447 (1976) said
it had never applied the exclusionary rule in civil proceedings, the rule should not be used
in OSHA proceedings. Id. But see Savina Home Indus. v. Secretary of Labor, 594 F.2d 1358,
1362 (10th Cir. 1979) (arguing that Janis does not preclude application of the exclusionary
rule in noncriminal proceedings). The Savina court also noted several instances in which the
Supreme Court and circuit courts have approved application of the exclusionary rule in
certain civil cases characterized as 'quasi-criminal.' E.g., One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965) (where the Court held the exclusionary rule applies to certain
forfeiture proceedings); Midwest Growers Coop. Corp. v. Kirkemo, 533 F.2d 455 (9th Cir. 1976)
(permanent injunction against the use of materials seized pursuant to an invalid administrative search warrant); Pizzarello v. United States, 408 F.2d 579 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 US.
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apply to OSHA inspections in violation of Barlow's holding.154
THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIONARY
RULE IN OSHA INSPECTIONS

The OSHRC has determined that the exclusionary rule should apply in

OSHA actions. 165 The circuit courts that have reviewed OSHRC decisions
applying the exclusionary rule have agreed with its position. 56 The circuit
courts, however, disagree about recognizing a good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule.
Even before the OSHRC applied the exclusionary rule in post-Barlow's cases,
adopting a good faith exception in OSHA actions had already been suggested.15 7 Recently, two circuit courts faced with the applicability of a good
faith exception in OSHA proceedings came to opposite conclusions.
In Donovan v. Federal Clearing Die Casting Co. & OSHRC,18 the Seventh
Circuit expressly approved using a reasonable good faith exception in OSHA
actions.159 OSHA officials had conducted an inspection pursuant to a warrant
that had been upheld by the district court and provisionally upheld by the
Seventh Circuit.'6" The warrant, however, was later invalidated for lack of
probable cause.' 61 At the hearing on citations issued for violations found
986 (1969) (since illegally seized evidence was used to compute jeopardy assessment, the tax
was illegal).
154. Savina Home Indus. v. Secretary of Labor, 594 F.2d 1358, 1363 (10th Cir. 1979). For
fuller exploration of the Todd and Savina opinions on the applicability of the exclusionary
rule in the OSHA context, see Trant, supra note 17, at 687-89. For analysis of Savina and its
potential influence on future cases, see Comment, Applicability of the Exclusionary Rule to
Illegal OSHA Inspections: Savina Home Indus. v. Secretary of Labor, 64 MINN. L. Rav. 789
(1980).
155. Secretary of Labor v. Sarasota Concrete Co., 9 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1608 (Rev.
Comm'n 1981), afJ'd, Donovan v. Sarasota Concrete Co., 693 F.2d 1061 (l1th Cir. 1982). The
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides that "[a]ny oral or documentary evidence may
be received, but the agency as matter of policy shall provide for the exclusion of irrelevant,
immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence." 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1976).
However, the APA is not the only guideline for determining whether evidence is to be
excluded. The fourth amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures also
may cause evidence to be excluded. See Knoll Assoc., Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968)
(setting aside an FTC order on the grounds that the Commission's acceptance and use of
corporate documents, known to be stolen on behalf of the government, violated the fourth
amendment). See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, §§ 350-354. See also 4 B. MEZINES, J. STEIN & J.
GRUFF, ADAINIsrRATIVE LAW § 30.01 (1982).
156. See Donovan v. Federal Clearing Die Casting Co., 695 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir. 1982);
Donovan v. Sarasota Concrete Co., 693 F.2d 1061 (lth Cir. 1982).
157. See Robberson Steel Co. v. OSHRC, 645 F.2d 22, 22 (10th Cir. 1980). Although
Robberson was decided on the nonretroactivity analysis applied in Savina, the Robberson
court said the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit in Williams was "equally applicable to civil
OSHA enforcement proceedings." Id.
158. 695 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir. 1982).
159. Id. at 1023.
160. Id.
161. Id. The warrant was ultimately held invalid in Donovan v. Federal Clearing Die
Casting Co., 655 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1981). Thus the question here was "whether the evidence
gathered through OSHA's reasonable and good-faith inspection pursuant to a warrant upheld
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during the inspection, the defendant moved to suppress all evidence obtained

through the invalid inspection warrant. 16 2 Following the dismissal of the proceedings, the Labor Secretary appealed to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit.163 The Seventh Circuit assessed the societal harm incurred by suppressing relevant and probative evidence and expressed its belief

that good faith errors cannot be deterred by the exclusionary rule. :6 4 Finding
that the compliance officers had acted reasonably and in good faith in relying

on the warrant, the Seventh Circuit held the fourth amendment did not re-

quire excluding the evidence. 6 5
In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit in Donovan v. Sarasota Concrete Co.1 66
rejected the Labor Secretary's argument that evidence obtained under a
warrant that is later invalidated should be admissible because the OSHA compliance officer had acted in good faith. 67 The compliance officer had procured
a warrant authorizing a full scope inspection. 168 The warrant was subsequently
declared invalid for lack of sufficient administrative probable cause. 69 The
Eleventh Circuit agreed with OSHRC's assessment that the exclusionary rule
has a potential deterrent impact and should be applied in OSHA proceedings."6 The court therefore upheld the Commission's decision not to lessen
7
that impact by recognizing a good faith exception.1 '
The conflicting results of Federal Clearing and Sarasota Concrete show the
need for further analysis of the good faith exception in the OSHA context.
Criminal procedure cases may give some guidance in applying the good faith
exception in OSHA proceedings, but the particularities of OSHA procedures
must also be considered.
EVALUATING THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION TO THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN OSHA PROCEEDINGS

Although the Supreme Court has not yet explicitly recognized the good

faith exception doctrine, it implicitly recognized the doctrine in Michigan v.
DeFillipo.172 Moreover, five of the present Justices have expressed interest in
modifying the scope of the exclusionary rule173 If the purpose of the exclusionby the district court and provisionally upheld by this Court must be suppressed under the
exclusionary rule because the warrant was invalidated on appeal more than a year thereafter." 695 F2d at 1023.
162. Id. at 1021.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1024.
165. See id. at 1023.
166. 693 F.2d 1061 (11th Cir. 1982).
167. Id. at 1072.
168. Id. at 1063.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1071.

171. See id. at 1072.
172.

443 U.S. 31, 36 (1979). See supra text accompanying notes 85-91.

173. Recently, Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist, White, Powell, and O'Connor
indicated their desire to modify the exclusionary rule when they rescheduled Gates and

asked the parties to address the question "whether the rule requiring the exclusion at a

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol35/iss4/7

20

Perfit: The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule in OSHA Proceed
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. XXXV

ary rule is to guarantee a personal constitutional right, as the Supreme Court
suggested in Weeks v. United States and Mapp v. Ohio, the rule should not be
undercut by an exception.174 However, in view of the Court's current acceptance of deterrence as the primary rationale for the rule, 17 the good faith
exception appears to be a logical means for limiting the exclusion of probative
176
evidence in criminal trials.
Even if the good faith eKception is eventually recognized by the Supreme
Court in the criminal setting, it should not be accepted in the OSHA context.
The arguments supporting its application in criminal trials are less persuasive
in OSHA proceedings. Though it appears to mitigate the seemingly harsh
remedy for unintentional violations of fourth amendment rights, the good
faith exception could undermine those rights by substituting mere good
1 77
faith for the probable cause requirement of the fourth amendment.
SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT FOR THE GOOD FAITH
ExcEPTION -

IS IT APPLICABLE IN THE

OSHA CONTEXT?
The sweeping good faith exception recognized by the Fifth Circuit included
both good faith mistakes made by officers in assessing probable cause in the
field and good faith technical violations made by police in relying on statutes
or warrants subsequently declared unconstitutional.178 The only case where
the Supreme Court has arguably recognized a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule is Michigan v. DeFillipo.Though DeFillipowas not decided explicitly on good faith grounds, the majority did focus on the arresting officers'
good faith and reasonableness in enforcing a statute that had not yet been
declared unconstitutional.17 9
The DeFilliposituation could not occur in the OSHA setting. In Marshall
v. Barlow's, the Supreme Court held section 8(a) of O.S.H.A. unconstitutional
because it purported to authorize warrantless OSHA inspections. S0 Since
Barlow's, there is no statute upon which compliance officers could reasonably
and in good faith rely as there was in DeFillipo.18 Therefore, if the Supreme
Court continues to limit the good faith exception to technical violations resulting solely from reliance on subsequently overturned statutes,182 the good faith
exception may have no application in the OSHA context.
criminal trial of evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment . . . should be
modified." Lauter, NAT'L L.J. Mar. 14, 1983, at 6, col. 1. However, Gates was ultimately
decided on other grounds. 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983). Writing for the majority, Justice
Rehnquist said the modification issue would be reserved for another day. 103 S. Ct. at 2325.
174. See Ball, supranote 19, at 650.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 41-56.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 58-60.
177. See id.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 95-99.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 85-90.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 143-47.
181. There are a few limited exceptions to the warrant requirement in the OSHA
setting, see infra notes 204-08 and accompanying text.
182. See Michigan v. DeFillipo, 443 U.S. at 38. See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying
text.
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In dicta, however, several Justices have suggested that good faith technical
violations should encompass reliance not only on statutes subsequently dedared unconstitutional but also on search warrants subsequently invalidated. 183
Following Barlow's, OSHA inspections generally have been conducted with
the employer's consent or with administrative search warrants. To admit evidence obtained through warrants later declared invalid on the theory such
evidence was obtained in good faith would seriously undercut employers'
fourth amendment rights.' 8 '
The fourth amendment expressly states that no warrants shall issue except

upon probable cause.8 5 Acceptance of a good faith exception would, in effect,
substitute good faith for the constitutionally mandated probable cause. 8 6
This substitution would severely weaken the vitality of the exclusionary rule.
Because good faith is such an intangible concept, there are numerous possibilities for abuse. If warrants are judged merely by the good faith of those executing them, magistrates relying on the officials' knowledge and integrity could
issue warrants without requiring a sufficient showing of probable cause. This
procedure would be in direct violation of the fourth amendment, yet the
evidence obtained would be admissible in court. 8 7
In addition to constitutional considerations, there is a practical reason for
not allowing evidence obtained through invalid warrants to be introduced in
administrative proceedings. At present, courts disagree as to the proper scope of
OSHA inspection warrants based on evidence of specific violations alleged in
employee complaints. 8s If good faith is substituted for probable cause, what
constitutes probable cause for nouroutine, full scope inspections may never be
settled. 81 9 Perhaps the greatest contribution of the exclusionary rule is that it has
forced the Supreme Court to define the standard of probable cause required by
the fourth amendment in the criminal context. 90 That function should not be
ignored in the developing area of administrative search law.
188. See Stone v. Powell, 428 US. at 499 (Burger, CJ., concurring); id. at 539 (White, J.,
dissenting); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. at 611-12 (Powell, J., concurring in part).
184. There are fewer exceptions to the warrant requirement in the OSHA context than
in the criminal context. See infra text accompanying notes 204-208 (exceptions in the OSHA
context include consent, plain view and emergency), and supra note 5 (exceptions in the
criminal context include consent, plain view, emergency, searches incident to arrest, automobile searches, stop and frisk searches).
185. U.S. CONST. amend IV. See supra note 2.
186. In both Sarasota Concrete and Federal Clearing, the Secretary of Labor asked the
respective courts to ignore the question whether or not there was probable cause to issue
the warrants and to consider instead the good faith of the OSHA compliance officers in
executing the warrants. See supra text accompanying notes 158-71.
187. Regardless of the good faith belief of the official executing the warrant, if the
warrant is not based on probable cause, it does not conform with the fourth amendment.
188. Some courts take the position that a warrant based on an employee complaint alleging
a specific and isolated violation should be limited in scope to the'matters described in the
complaint. See supra note 151. Others insist that a warrant based on a specific complaint
should not be limited to the area of the complaint. See supra note 150.
189. The exciusion of evidence would not depend upon the validity of the warrant, but
on the good faith of those executing it.
190. When evidence may be excluded because its acquisition violates constitutional
guarantees, the definition of those guarantees becomes extremely important. See Mertens &
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IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CRIMINAL
AND

OSHA

SETTINGS

Even if the Supreme Court should decide to admit evidence obtained with
subsequently invalidated warrants in criminal trials, significant differences
between the criminal and OSHA context must be considered in evaluating
the good faith exception in the OSHA setting. The strongest argument for
permitting a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule is the cost to society
resulting from the exclusion of reliable and probative evidence. 19 1 In the
19 2
criminal context, the cost is criminals going free if the constable blunders.
In the OSHA context, the consequence might be that unsafe working conditions will continue because the compliance officer blunders. For several
reasons, however, the social costs argument does not carry as much weight in
the OSHA setting as in the criminal.
O.S.H.A. directs the Secretary of Labor to set and enforce safety and health
standards. Regulations covering a myriad of possible violations have been
promulgated. 193 If during an inspection an OSHA compliance officer spots a
violation that can be remedied immediately, he will give the employer an opportunity to correct it. If the employer does so, the OSHA officer will not issue
a citation. This opportunity is permitted because the Act's purpose is to ensure
safe working conditions, not to cite and fine employers. 94 Thus, an employer
could remedy a violation -without the validity of the inspection warrant
coming in question.
Criminal and OSHA procedures differ in another respect. Unlike the
criminal context, if evidence obtained in an unlawful inspection is excluded
in an OSHA proceeding, the Secretary of Labor may reinspect at a later date
upon obtaining a proper warTant. Employees and employee representatives are
encouraged to notify OSHA when they believe a safety or health standard is
being violated. 9 5 Employers do not want to be bothered with endless inspections and the possibility of fines. Consequently, if employers succeed in
having citations or penalties dismissed because the evidence was obtained under
an invalid warrant, they will probably rectify the hazard before OSHA compliance officers return. The Act's purpose thus can be achieved with respect to
less serious violations even though the exclusionary rule is applied without a
good faith exception.
If an inspector finds serious violations of safety and health standards that
must be addressed immediately, he may request a court order to close the
Wasserstrom, supra note 98, at 463 ("It is easy to forget that we knew neither what the

[fourth] amendment meant nor what standards it set for law enforcement, until courts set
out to give it content in the courses of deciding when evidence should or should not be
suppressed').
191. See supra note 57.
192. See People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 23-24, 150 N.E. 585, 587-588 (1926) (opinion by
Cardozo, J.) (under the exclusionary rule, "[t]he criminal is to go free because the constable
has blundered').
193. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1-.1500 (1982).
194. See 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1976).
195. Id. § 657(t)(1).
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dangerous machine or area to employees.9 6 The inspector must notify the employer and employees both of the danger and of his decision to recommend
a court injunction. 197 The employer will probably consent to the dosing if
he agrees that a danger to employees exists. If the employer disagrees, employees
may refuse to work with that machine or in that area, and their decision will
be protected by the Act.198 Either way, the Act's goal of ensuring safe working
conditions would be attained despite the possibility that the warrant's validity
could be questioned at a later hearing.
Not only are the social costs of excluding evidence in OSHA proceedings
lower than those in criminal trials, but the potential for deterrence of official
misconduct is higher in the OSHA context. Police who apprehend a suspect
then deliver him to another governmental body for prosecution. Conversely,
OSHA officials are directly involved in the entire process of enforcing the
Act, not only through inspections but also through enforcement proceedings. 19 9 Thus, under the balancing test developed by the Supreme Court in
Calandra200 the deterrent effect of the exclusionary sanction would appear to
outweigh the societal costs of exclusion.
Application of the exclusionary rule without a good faith exception also
encourages compliance officers to learn what is legal and what is not. Unlike
their counterparts in the criminal sector who must contend with the many
intricacies of fourth amendment law, compliance officers only have to master
administrative search warrant law.20 1 Efficient enforcement of the Act depends
on compliance officers taking this responsibility seriously.
It can be argued that since OSHA searches involve a lesser intrusion than
criminal searches the good faith exception should apply in OSHA proceedings.
In Camara, however, the Supreme Court adjusted for this "lesser intrusion"
by requiring a lower standard of probable cause for administrative searches
than that required in criminal searches. 20 2 Adding a good faith exception to

196. Id. § 662(a).
197. Id. § 662(c).
198. See id.§ 660(c)(1); 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(b)(2) (1979). See also Marshall v. N.L.
Indus., Inc., 618 F.2d 1220 (7th Cir. 1980) (Secretary of Labor brought action against an employer alleging he had violated O.S.HA. by firing an employee for refusing to work under
allegedly unsafe conditions); Marshall v. Whirlpool Corp., 593 F.2d 715 (6th Cir. 1979),
aff'd, 445 US. 1 (1980) (upholding the Secretary of Labor's regulation granting employees the
right to refuse work when confronted with job conditions that threaten serious injury or

death).
In addition, some employees are covered by "just cause" firing clauses in union-negotiated
contracts. The growing trend is to protect employees who report suspected violations of

federal, state, or local law to a public body. Andrews, When You Whistle Where You
., 11 STUDENT LAW. 11, 40 (Mar. 1983).
199. Donovan v. Federal Clearing Die Casting Co., 695 F.2d at 1020 (Pell, J., dissenting)
("The deterrent effect could be significantly greater in the case of a Government agency such
as OSHA than it would in the case of an ordinary policeman who may have little to do
after the search and seizure other than to be witness in subsequent court proceedings.').

Work..

200. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349 (1979).
201. See Trant, supranote 17, at 716.
202. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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this lower probable cause standard rationale would be contrary to the See
20
Court's concern for protecting the constitutional rights of businessmen. 3
Finally, since there are already exceptions to the warrant requirement in the
OSHA context, 20 4 the Act's purpose will not be frustrated if the good faith

exception is rejected. Most OSHA inspections are conducted with the consent
of the employer; thus no warrant is involved at all.205 The plain view exception permits inspectors to issue citations without a warrant if they discover
a violation from a lawful vantage point. 200 The Camara Supreme Court explicitly stated that the emergency exception to the warrant requirement will
be recognized in the administrative search context.2 0 7 Thus, when dangerous
conditions exist, the warrant requirement can be waived and the exclusionary
rule is inapplicable.2 0 8 These exceptions provide compliance officers with the
flexibility necessary to enforce the Act and support the conclusion that a good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule in the OSHA setting is inappropriate.
CONCLUSION

OSHA inspections serve an important function. Without them, regulations
promulgated to ensure safe and healthful working conditions would remain
unenforced. Because of OSHA compliance officers' broad discretion in deciding which businesses to inspect, the Supreme Court in Barlow's held the fourth
amendment warrant requirement applies to OSHA inspections. Since Barlow's,
several circuit courts have faced the question whether evidence obtained from
warrantless inspections or inspections made pursuant to faulty warrants should
be admissible in OSHA proceedings.
The lower federal courts have agreed with OSHRC that the exclusionary
rule may be applied in OSHA proceedings. The courts have divided, however,
on OSHRC's refusal to apply a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
The Seventh Circuit recently applied the good faith exception in an OSHA
action to a technical violation resulting from good faith reliance on a warrant
that was subsequently invalidated. 20 9 Despite dicta indicating that several
203. See supra note 115.
204. Exceptions to the warrant requirement in the OSHA context include consent, plain
view, and emergency. Compare these with the exceptions in the criminal context, supra note 5.

205. In the three or four month period after Barlow's, fewer than 500 employers requested
warrants in approximately 11,000 inspections attempted by OSHA compliance officers. 8
O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 564 (1978), cited in, Rothstein, supra note 149, at 84 n.132.
206. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 315 (1978) ("What is observable by the
public is observable, without a warrant, by the government inspector as well."). See, e.g.,
Marshall v. Western Waterproofing Co., 560 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1977) (OSHA inspection of
scaffolding hanging from a building is not subject to fourth amendment objections since
scaffolding was observable by members of the public).

207. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967).
208. See Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509-10 (1978) (holding that a warrant is not
required for an administrative search during an emergency). For OSHA inspections the
emergency exception is probably limited to imminent dangers or other exigent circumstances.
Rothstein, supra note 149, at 86. A warrantless inspection may be justified when an accident
or fatality has occurred and a prompt inspection is necessary to prevent a recurrence. Id.
However, OSHA should try to obtain consent if possible. Id.
209. Donovan v. Federal Clearing Die Casting Co., 695 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir. 1982).
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Justices support the good faith exception in the criminal context, the Supreme
Court has not yet accepted it. Because such an exception effectively substitutes
good faith for the probable cause required by the fourth amendment, it is
questionable whether an exception for good faith technical violations would
be constitutionally permissible.
Even if the Supreme Court ultimately recognizes a good faith exception
for criminal cases, such an exception should not be adopted in OSHA proceedings. OSHA and criminal settings differ significantly. The deterrent effect
of the exclusionary rule is higher in OSHA proceedings than in criminal trials.
In contrast to criminal enforcement where different agencies apprehend and
prosecute a suspect, in OSHA proceedings, one agency is responsible for both
apprehension and prosecution. Furthermore, the societal costs of exclusion are
lower because the Act's purpose can be achieved despite the occasional exclusion of evidence from citation and penalty hearings. Both for constitutional
and policy reasons, the exclusionary rule should apply in OSHA proceedings
without being vitiated by a good faith exception.
RosEmARY PEPrr
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